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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
school system. If municipalities are not "persons" under § 1983, then
city officials must pay this cost. The absurdity of the decision is more than
evident.
PARIS FAVORS
Double Jeopardy: Chase v. Oklahoma & Smith v. Missouri
On November 12, 1973, the United States Supreme Court denied
petitions for writs of cert. in both Chase v. State of Oklahoma,1 and Smith
v. State of Missouri.2 In both cases, the petitioners were contending that
their constitutional protection against double jeopardy, as embodied in
the Fifth Amendment, and applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 3 had been violated. In both cases, there was a rigorous dissent
by Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice
Marshall joined. The basis of the dissents was that in both cases, petitioners
had been prosecuted by their respective states in separate proceedings
for crimes which arose out of the same transaction or episode, in violation
of the Supreme Court's ruling in Ashe v. Swenson. 4
In Chase, the petitioner and his passengers overpowered a Deputy
Sheriff and took his .38 caliber pistol after having been stopped for a routine
traffic violation. Afterwards, the deputy was forced to drive to several
different locations where he was further beaten. Before he was released,
his wallet was taken. Chase was tried and convicted by a jury in Muskegee
County, Oklahoma, for Kidnapping for Extortion and received a sentence of
35 years. Later, the state brought separate charges against petitioner for the
possession of the deputy's gun. Petitioner was also convicted this second
time for the offense of Carrying a Firearm, and sentenced to 10 years
imprisonment. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals modified
petitioner's term of imprisonment to five years, but rejected petitioner's
claim that the second prosecution violated his constitutional protection
against double jeopardy.
In the case of Smith, an apartment which was occupied by Mrs. Hermine
Rohs, her son Willy Rohs, and his wife Marilyn, was forcefully entered
by petitioner and one Edward Johnson. The aforementioned residents were
robbed; both women were raped; and finally, all three were stabbed to
death. The petitioner, Smith, was indicted on three separate charges of
Frank Chase v. State of Oklahoma, 509 P.2d. 171, cert. denied, -U.S.-, 94 S.Ct. 458
(1973).
2 Willie J. Smith v. State of Missouri, 491 S.W. 2d. 257, cert. denied, -U.S.-, 94 S.Ct.
460 (1973).
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, (1969).
Ashe v. Swenson, 399 F.2d. 40, rev'd per curiam, 397 U.S. 436, (1970).
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murder in the first degree. (Edward Johnson, who was also indicted, tried,
and convicted for first-degree murder, did not petition the Supreme Court
to review his case.) Petitioner was first tried for the murder of Marilyn
Rohs, with the death penalty being sought. He was convicted by the jury
of first-degree murder, but punishment was assessed at life imprisonment.
Then, the state tried petitioner for the murder of Willy Rohs, again seeking
the death penalty. Once again, the jury found him guilty of first-degree
murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The judge indicated that
the two life sentences were to run consecutively. Thereafter, the state
entered a plea of nolle prosequi on the third indictment. Both convictions
were affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court which rejected petitioner's
claim that the second prosecution violated his constitutional protection
against double jeopardy.
As alluded to by Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in the two
cases at bar, the leading case in this area of law is Ashe v. Swenson. In
Ashe, three or four masked gunmen robbed six men who were engaged
in a poker game. Petitioner was acquitted in a state trial for the robbery
of one of the poker players. Six weeks later, the defendant was tried again
for the robbery of another one of the players. This time, he was convicted.
The witnesses in both of the trials were basically the same and the state's
evidence establishing the facts of the robbery was uncontradicted, but
the testimony identifying the defendant as one of the robbers was much
stronger at the second trial. The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Missouri, which held that the plea of former jeopardy must be
denied. Five years later, a collateral attack upon the conviction in the
state courts was also unsuccessful. Then, based on the claim that the
second prosecution had violated his right not to be twice put in jeopardy,
the defendant brought a habeas corpus proceeding in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The District Court
denied the writ, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted cert, and reversed
the lower court decisions. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing
the view of seven members of the court, it was held that since the single
rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury was whether the
defendant was one of the robbers, the federal rule of collateral estoppel,
which is embodied in the Fifth Amendment's guaranty against double
jeopardy, made the second trial wholly impermissible.
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice
Marshall, concurred, adding that even if the rule of collateral estoppel
had been inapplicable to the facts of the case, the double jeopardy clause
nevertheless barred the second prosecution because it grew out of the same
criminal episode as the first.
The phrase "collateral estoppel," admittedly awkward, stands for the
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principle that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by
a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between
the same parties in any future lawsuit. The court further added that the
federal decisions had made it clear that in criminal cases the rule of col-
lateral estoppel was not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic
approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality.
In both Chase and Smith, each state was able to distinguish its case
from the case of Ashe, on the lower level. In Chase, the State contended
that Kidnapping for Extortion was an entirely different offense, requiring
different evidence, proof, etc., than the offense of Carrying a Firearm.
Quite similarly, the state, in Smith, contended that each of the three
deaths constituted a separate offense. In addition, the state here contended
that there was no violation of the principle of Ashe because they concluded
that collateral estoppel does not come into play unless defendant has been
acquitted in a prior trial. They based their findings on State v. Moton.5 In
the Moton case, defendant, Moton, and a companion were accused of armed
robbery of two service station attendants. Even though the evidence indi-
cated that Moton and his companion entered the station at the same time (his
companion being the only one with a gun), and that each defendant obtained
money from separate gas station attendants, the defendant's conviction
of the robbery of one gas station attendant from whom defendant's com-
panion had obtained money did not bar subsequent prosecution for robbery
of the second gas station attendant from whom the defendant had obtained
money, on the theory of double jeopardy, where property was taken from
both attendants even though both robberies occurred almost simultaneously.
The Fifth Amendment provides that ". . . nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
There is no question about the applicability of this amendment to the states,
through the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the main question for
determination is "what is. meant by the words-same offence?" As we
have seen, there has been much disagreement on this point.
Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall contend that the words re-
quire the prosecution, except in extremely limited circumstances 6 not
present in either of the cases at hand, "to join at one trial all the charges
against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence,
episode or transaction."17
On the other hand, it has been successfully contended that offenses
against different individuals, as well as offenses of different natures, al-
though committed as near simultaneously as possible, constitute different
offenses for the purpose of the double jeopardy clause.
, State v. Moton, 476 S.W. 2d. 785 (1972).
6 Such circumstances may include, for example, crimes not completed or not discovered
until after commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction.
Another example would be where no single court had jurisdiction of all the alleged crimes.
1 397 U.S. at 453-454.
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It is the writer's contention that the view of Mr. Justice Brennan should
be followed. That is, that the Fifth Amendment requires the prosecution to
join at one trial all of the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single
criminal act, occurrence, episode or transaction. There are several
reasons for this mandate. First, it promotes justice, economy, and
convenience. This is reflected by the modem rules of criminal and
civil procedures. Second, as Mr. Justice Brennan argues in Ashe, the
phrase "same offense" is not necessarily restricted to the "same evidence"
test, but rather, includes the "same transaction" test. Under the same
evidence test, only those crimes that require the exact same evidence are
required to be joined. The truth is that the Supreme Court has rejected
the idea that the same evidence test is the required construction of the
Fifth Amendment in a case involving multiple trials. 9
The case of Smith is a glaring example of the hazards of abuse of the
criminal process inherent in the "same evidence" test and demonstrates
the necessity for the "same transaction" test. The murders involved three
individuals. The petitioner was indicted on three separate charges of mur-
der, with the state admittedly seeking the death penalty. Petitioners first
trial was under the indictment charging him with the murder of Marilyn
Rohs. Since no justification was offered for not trying the other indictments
at that trial, it is reasonable to infer that the other indictments were held
in reserve to be tried if the state failed to obtain a conviction or the desired
penalty. In addition to this, it was not until the trial judge had specified
that the two life sentences would run consecutively that the prosecution
entered a plea of nolle prosequi on the third indictment. As Mr. Justice
Brennan says,
"... one must experience a sense of uneasiness with any double
jeopardy standard that would allow the State this second chance
to plug up the holes in its case. The constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is empty of meaning if the State may make 'repeated
attempts' to touch up its case by forcing the accused to 'run the
gantlet' as many times as there are victims of a single episode."' 1
Although the American Law Institute originally (1935) adopted the
same evidence test, it has since been replaced with the same transaction
test."I England has also discarded its rules against joinder of charges and
has adopted the "same transaction" test. 12 The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure liberally encourage the joining of parties and charges in a single
trial. Rule 8(a) provides for joinder of charges that are similar in character,
s United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724-726 ( ).
9 In Re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 16 (1889). Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
10 397 U.S. at 459.
11 ALl, Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft §§ 1.07(2), 1.09(I)(b)(1962).
12 Connelly v. D.P.P. (1964) A.C. 1254.
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or arise from the same transaction, or from connected transactions or
form part of a common scheme or plan. Rule 8(b) provides for joinder of
defendants. Rule 13 provides for joinder of separate indictments or in-
formations in a single trial where the offenses alleged could have been
included in one indictment or information.
In concluding, a quotation from the last paragraph of Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Ashe would be relevant
Abuse of the criminal process is foremost among the feared evils
that led to the inclusion of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the Bill
of Rights. That evil will be most effectively avoided, and the Clause
can thus best serve its worthy ends, if "same offence" is construed
to embody the "same transaction" standard. Then both federal and
state prosecutors will be prohibited from mounting successive
prosecutions for offenses growing out of the same criminal episode,
at least in the absence of a showing of unavoidable necessity for
successive prosecutions in the particular case.13
Thus, until the same transaction standard, as espoused by Mr. Justice
Brennan, is adopted by all of the courts in our country, the Fifth Amend-
ment protection against double jeopardy will remain devoid of meaning.
DONNIE HOOVER
The Affirmative Duty to Desegregate State Systems of Higher
Education Without Eliminating Racially Identifiable Schools-
I. INTRODUCTION
In Adams v. Richardson, the appellees, citizens and taxpayers brought
an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against appellants, Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare and the Director of HEW's Office of Civil
Rights. They alleged that appellants had been derelict in their duty to en-
force Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because appellants had not
taken suitable and timely action to end segregation in public educational in-
stitutions receiving federal funds. Title VI provides that discrimination in
federally assisted programs must cease or those programs will no longer
be federally assisted. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
13 397 U.S. at 459-460.
1 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
2 42 U.S.C. § 200d (1964) provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
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